PART 2: CASE STUDY OF WHY AND HOW NIGERIA SHOULD UNDERTAKE COST EFFECTIVE UPGRADATION OF LEGACY 105MM AND 122MM HOWITZERS ALONG WITH THEIR MOBILE VERSION.

PART 2...........

FOR THE NIGERIAN HOWITZERS BOTH IN UPGRADED TOWED AND SELF PROPELLED VERSION THE MAN PORTABLE ORBITAL TACTICAL UAV AMONG OTHERS IS BEST SUITED TO SERVE AS A DIGITAL FIRE SUPPORT OFFICER ALONE OR IN TANDEM WITH THE TRADITIONAL HUMAN FORWARD OBSERVERS FOR BETTER COMBINED ARMS WARFARE

TACTICAL UAV is an unmanned aerial vehicle small enough to be man-portable. Example ORBITER

FIG 6: ORBITER TACTICAL UAV  FIG 7: HAND HELD GROUND CONTROL STATION (GCS)

 

The Orbiter mini UAV provides field commanders with near-instant "over the hill" reconnaissance capability, and is easily controlled in either Waypoints Navigation or Camera Guidance (UAV slaved to camera) modes. The Orbiter System can be transported, assembled, launched and operated by just two persons after minimal training. The entire Orbiter System fits into one backpack and no additional personnel need to be fielded.

FEATURES

1.  Man-pack/vehicle transportable

2.  Assembled in 10 minutes

3.  Launched by a catapult, bungee or hand

4.  Very low noise signature

5.  Easily controlled from handheld Personal GCS

6.  Automatic parachute + airbag recovery

7.  Day and night operational capability

8.  15 km range

9.  1.5 hour flight endurance

10.  Rapid turn-around

Orbiter's Handheld Personal GCS is a compact unit that can be worn over a protective vest or mounted on a tripod. The Personal Ground Control Station unites a user-friendly software interface with advanced Real-Time Control hardware. Even an inexperienced operator, with minimal training, can successfully control all phases of an Orbiter mission and gather high-quality intelligence in real time. All of the acquired data (video & telemetry) is recorded by a built in DVR for up to 12 flight hours.

Payload: Day Operations

>  The D-STAMP fully stabilized payload gives sharp color video picture for day time operations. The payload features x10 optical zoom and full coverage in both azimuth and elevation.

Payload: Night Operations

>  The U-STAMP fully stabilized payload gives sharp thermal imaging video picture for night-time operations. The payload features digital zoom and full coverage in both azimuth and elevation.

The combination of “EYE IN THE SKY” and network-linked TACTICAL UAVs creates flat earth during the day and at night. It gives the artillery commanders the ability to increasing their effectiveness in the fight. And act as DIGITAL FIRE SUPPORT OFFICER (FSO).

Note: there are hundreds of TACTICAL UAVs to choose from if u don’t like mine then pick u r choice.

Also before anybody asks, CH 3 UAV is not suitable for the job because it requires a runway and has a fairly large command and control logistic footprint. If the target area is within the operational range of CH 3 operating from a nearby base, then it can be used.

FIG 5: ORBITER TACTICAL UAV IN A BACKPACK

Primary set:
The entire fielded ORBITER system disassembles and fits into one backpack

1.  1x ORBITER
2.  Personal GCS
3.  Launcher
4.  Data link

Backup set:
A second backpack, for prolonged operational readiness
1.  2 x ORBITER
2.  Spare Batteries
3.  Spare Payloads

THE HEART AND BRAIN OF ANY DECENT ARTILLERY TOWED OR MOBILE GUN SYSTEM (MGS) IS THE FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM (FCS).

FOR THE NIGERIAN OTO MELARA 105 MM MOD 56 HOWITZERS BOTH IN TOWED AND SELF PROPELLED VERSION THE MODULAR ARTILLERY FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM IS A WIN-WIN OPTION

The Modular Artillery Fire Control System (MAFCS) by Astronautics from ISRAEL is a highly adaptive solution for Self-Propelled and Towed Artillery Guns. Especially the 105mm howitzers, it easily overcomes the operational restrictions placed on modern artillery by traditional survey and deployment methods.

The MAFCS enables AUTONOMOUS GUN NAVIGATION and POINTING and provides BALLISTIC COMPUTATION capabilities to enhance weapon operation. The system’s ability to perform rapid changes of position, as well as its high responsiveness, enables the crew to SHOOT AND SCOOT and thus gains the force-multiplier advantage which is essential to the modern battlefield.

The system meets modern MAFCS requirements, consists of Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) components, is in full-scale production and has been extensively tested and used by several armies.

The MAFCS consists of the following elements

1.  Vehicle Reference Unit (VRU) - Kearfott's MILNAVA®, KN-4053, three-axis Monolithic Ring Laser Gyro (MRLG), embedded GPS

2.  Commander's Modular Processing and Control & Display Unit (CDU&TC)

3.  Gunner's Display Unit (GDU)

4.  Muzzle Velocity Radar (MVR)

5.  Vehicle Motion Sensor (VMS)

                            

FIG 6: SYSTEM BLOCK DIAGRAM FOR MODULAR ARTILLERY FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM FOR BOTH TOWED AND SELF PROPELLED VERSION

Main Components Description:

1.Vehicle Reference Unit (VRU):

The VRU is a fully integrated inertial navigation unit with an optional GPS receiver which may either be embedded or external (PLGR). The VRU is installed on the elevating mass of the Gun and provides a continuous high precision output of position and attitude of the weapon. The VRU performs all navigation, attitude, pointing and north finding functions with heading accuracy to better than 1 mil RMS and attitude accuracy to better than 0.5 mil RMS.

2.Commander’s Control and Display Unit &Tactical Computer (CDU&TC):
The CDU&TC unit is provided for use by the gun’s Commander or by the gunner in case the system doesn’t include the GDU. The CDU&TC includes a powerful processor, which provides overall control, management and fire control computation within the system. The CDU&TC includes a sunlight readable display and performs all system level management and processing tasks within the MAFCS. The various functions can be defined as Commander MMI overall system mode control and management (VRU, Gunner Display, Radio, MVR and other optional units), graphic display generation and the on‐board technical fire control. Per customer request, 2D/3D map layers can be incorporated for navigation and control purposes

3.Gunner’s Display Unit (GDU):
The GDU is provided to the gunner for pointing the gun and in very short time to the required attitude. 

4.       Muzzle Velocity Radar (MVR):
The MAFCS is designed to accept inputs from a MVR to allow real time monitoring of the effect of gun wear and, in a predictive manner, to improve the ballistic computation. The MVR processing unit and antenna are housed in a single module located externally at the front of the cradle. The MVR measurements are integrated within the ballistic computation process, via a predictive algorithm, to improve the first-round effectiveness of the weapon and avoid the need for traditional calibration rounds.

5.Vehicle Motion Sensor (VMS):
The VMS provides a continuous independent measurement of wheel or track speed to the VRU during vehicle/gun movement for optimal system performance. The VMS is mounted within the engine compartment on the vehicle front chassis wall.

                                     FIG 7: THE CDU&TC (FOR THE COMMANDER) INSIDE THE CABIN OF THE TRUCK MOUNTED ARTILLERY SYSTEM (GMS)

MAFCS FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM ON A TOWED HOWITZER

The 105mm towed gun below has been upgraded with the above fire control system. Since it is a standalone artillery gun therefore CDU&TC unit is used which will be used by the gunner. The gunner display unit GDU is not necessary in this case.

The other rectangular box mounted near the recoil dampers contains the Muzzle Velocity Radar MVR and the VRU.

The CDU&TC is feed the necessary target coordinates and other relevant mission data by the gunner, which simultaneously also takes in inputs from the MVR to generate optimal fire solutions for first round hits.

FIG 8: THE VARIOUS COMPONENTS OF THE MAFCS FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM INSTALLED ON A 105MM TOWED HOWITZER

 MAFCS FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM ON A SELF PROPELLED HOWITZER

Here I have used the EVO 105 model as an example to highlight the MAFCS fire control system installation to be done on the OTO MELARA 105 mm mod 56 howitzers mounted on a truck for mobility.

The outriggers/stabilizers/brackets to hold the platform during firing including the mounting structure together with the gun drive system will be explained in another section.

In the picture below the Commander’s Control and Display Unit &Tactical Computer CDU&TC is installed inside the driver cabin. The cabin also houses the RADIOS for the commander to receive coordinates and fire correction from TACTICAL UAVs or FORWARD OBSERVERS.

The gunners display unit GDU is installed outside next to the gun for easy access by the gunner. The commanders CDU&TC does all the ballistic calculation etc and feeds all the generated fire solution to the GDU. The gunner in turn reads from the GDU and is thus able to align the gun faster and accurately for firing.

The VRU helps in gun Navigation and pointing as well as north finding to calculate accurately its own position which helps in laying down accurate fire on the target.

Additional benefits are that it can undertake shoot and scoot missions.

Addition of GPS also helps in navigation and pointing

Also all kinds of tactical information coming from tactical UAVs to FORWARD OBSERVERS can be displayed in the commanders CDU&TC display unit interleaved with 2 and/or 3 Dimensional (2-D/3-D) maps for better navigation and control.

 

 

Miscellaneous but necessary add-ons:

1.Cable for remote firing 

2.Ammo storage with individual shutters

3.Storage for propellant charges (if applicable)

4.Direct firing iron sights these are always included with the howitzer itself. In case of 

    emergency these can be used for indirect or direct firing.

5.A  weapons station for use by the crew for self defence(medium or heavy machine gun)

6.Intercom system for communication between the crew members.

7.The crew would consist of the commander, gunner and loader cum driver.

8. Also for better performance the driver’s cabin should have a passage for going into the rear

    the truck from the cabin itself, so that the driver can quickly switch the roles between 

    loader and driver. Also the passage can easily seat the gunner during travel. It can also

    accommodate the forward observer with his portable tactical UAV if necessary.

   

              

 

 PART 3..............

PART 1: CASE STUDY OF WHY AND HOW NIGERIA SHOULD UNDERTAKE COST EFFECTIVE UPGRADATION OF LEGACY 105MM AND 122MM HOWITZERS ALONG WITH THEIR MOBILE VERSION.

WHY?
(PAST AND PRESENT)

They are low-medium intensity conflicts mainly with BH terrorists in the northern part of the country. These “TERRORISTS” are in fact “SOMEWHAT SKILLED SOLDIERS” who have used a blend of traditional terrorist tactics combined with modern war-fighting techniques. They “MANOEUVRE” in reasonably disciplined formations and employ mortars and rockets in deadly barrages.

Use of high mobility APCs; CAPTURED TANKS; TECHNICAL’S mounted with a plethora of medium to heavy machine guns including anti aircraft cannons have become a cause of concern. Use of 14.5MM and 23MM calibre ARMOUR PIERCING and INCENDIARY rounds on infantry is really devastating; to see your colleagues being torn apart to shreds will deter even the BRAVEST OF THE BRAVE.                                                                                                                       

 

FIG1: BH TERRORIST TECHNICAL MOUNTED WITH WHAT LOOKS LIKE A DUAL 14.5 MM ANTI AIRCRAFT GUN

Hordes of “ATV AND MOTORCYCLE MOUNTED TERRORISTS” with RPGs and HEAVY MACHINE GUNs further complicate the situation.

 

FIG2: BH TERRORIST ATV WITH HEAVY MACHINE GUN AND MOTORCYCLE MOUNTED RPG TEAMS

These modern day terrorists have learned to utilize these mobile platforms to OUT-FLANK; OUT-MANOEUVRE engaging forces and PROVIDE REINFORCEMENTS; AMMUNITION RESUPPLY as per changing battlefield conditions.

 

FLASHBACK: TO A REAL LIFE ENCOUNTER OF A NIGERIAN ARMY SERGEANT WITH BH TERRORISTS

A brief yet informative narrative of a sergeant who was let down by circumstances and as far as I am concerned definitely not deserving to be called a deserter considering he served Nigerian Army for about twenty years.

An extract from his narrative

“Movement to the battle field
On a Sunday, precisely on the 8th of February, around 2am, we advanced towards Bajoga, a town between Yobe and Gombe States. We were there before 6am. Before advancing to the battle field, we were fed with tasteless jollof rice that was as dinner. About 9.30 to 10 am we started advancing to the location where the insurgents were. While we were advancing, the three helicopter gun -ships that we were earlier promised would assist in the operation hovered round and landed. Even the Alpha jet came and all of us were jubilant and battle -ready to win at all costs.

Hope dashed
however, five minutes before we met with our target, the helicopter and alpha jet disappeared. Even at the peak of the battle, our commander called them for backup but they did not surface. The battle raged for over four hours, they were surging like locusts towards us with sophisticated weapons including anti-aircraft guns. In conventional wars, such weapons are not used on human beings. They are used to fell aircrafts. But, the insurgents use them brazenly to kill our soldiers. It tears human body into shreds on contact.”

SOURCE: http://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/02/b-o-k-o-h-a-r-a-m-battle-field-account-of-a-military-deserter/

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ABOVE NARRATIVE ARE FAR REACHING.BEFORE THAT PLEASE TAKE A LOOK AT THE PICTURES BELOW TO UNDERSTAND THE SERGEANT POV .I HOPE U HAVE NOW GOT A ROUGH IDEA ABOUT THE SIZE OF THE HOLE IT’S GONNA MAKE WHEN IT HITS A HUMAN. AND JUST THINK HOW DEMORALIZING IT WAS FOR THOSE WHO HAD TO WITNESS IT LIVE.

FIG 3: PICTURE PROVIDES A RELATIVE IDEA OF THE SIZE OF A 12.7 ROUND FIG 4: COMPARISON OF THE 12.7MM ROUND TO 23MM

The underlined lines in the above narrative by the sergeant clearly shows that

1. Cannot rely on air support all the time.

2. worth mentioning is the following extract from the sergeant’s narrative

“OUR EQUIPMENT
it is pertinent to let you know how we were equipped for the war. Before the battle, they gave us three armoured tanks, three artillery guns, five APC’s, grenade launchers and AK47 rifles with three magazines per soldier. But on the day we started advancing, only one armoured tank, five APC’s, and artillery guns advanced with us. If we had gone into battle with, at least, the three armoured tanks, nothing would have made us lose the war. As the battle raged, it did not take time for their fire power to surpass ours.”

Assaults by infantry on heavily armed terrorist without adequate accompanying fire support is suicide. Using towed artillery without proper planning in a fast paced and fluid battlefield eats up manpower and time, and all advantages are turned upside down, which seems was the case here. In short, total mismanagement of available resources.

3. Failure to arm your forces with weapons exceeding or at least similar to the fire power of your opponents will lead to heavy casualties. All this it points to major intelligence failure to identify the weapons being used by the enemy before sending the soldiers to engage those terrorist.

Most of the African countries lack enough aircraft power to provide close bombing air support so the only option is to use artillery for providing massive fire support. And I don’t think this situation is going to change anytime soon. And Nigeria is no exception.

The Republic of Korea was the first in Vietnam to demonstrate micromanaged heavy artillery support from company-level fire bases for major operations. Unlike the US military which often constructed one big fire base for a battalion sized unit, to serve more strategic roles, Korean forces fragmented a battalion into several companies that had their own small fire bases to help win individual battles. They were built as close to each other as possible, the distance between them determined by the range of their artillery (most had mortars, some had 105mm howitzers). Their preference for smaller bases was also driven by the fact that Korean forces did not possess many 155mm for more large-scale and long-range bombardment. The companies' overlapping artillery coverage protected each other's flanks, and kept a continuous fire envelop over the paths that companies used to scout, encircle and establish cordon on the battalion's intended area of operations. Each company worked as reactionary forces for others from various points on the battlefield, both remotely and up close and personal.

On a smaller scale, they also had overlapping field of fire within the company base among platoons. When one platoon was pinned down under heavy fire from NV, it made it easier for the rest in the company to support that platoon by hitting the enemy from the rear. The result of this tactic in Koreans' small unit operations was phenomenal, as Korean ground forces in Vietnam continued to rack up massive kill ratio against NVA and the Viet Cong throughout the war. In some operations like Van Buren, Korean platoons annihilated an entire NVA battalion and disabled the regiment with very minimal losses. The high tactical viability and effectiveness of the company fire base concept set a precedent for other Free World forces to adapt it as one of their doctrine, even after the war had ended.

An analysis of Korean cordon and search operations was provided by Lieutenant General William R. Peers, who considered the Koreans to have more expertise in this kind of operation than any of the other forces he had seen in South Vietnam:

There were several key elements in their conduct of this type of operation. First, they are thorough in every detail in their

planning. Secondly, their cordon involves a comparatively small area, probably not in excess of 9 to 10 square kilometers for a regimental size force. Third, the maximum force is employed, generally consisting of a regiment up to something in excess of a division. And finally, the operation is rehearsed and critiqued before it is begun. Units are moved into locations around the periphery of the cordon by a variety of means, including helicopters, trucks and by foot, but so limed that all arrive in position simultaneously to complete the encirclement. The density of the troops is such that the distance between individuals on the cordon is less than 10 meters. They leave little opportunity for the enemy to ex-filtrate in small numbers. Areas, such as streams and gulley’s, are barricaded with barbed wire and other barrier materials, reinforced by troops who may remain in water chest deep over night. The closing of the cordon is very slow and deliberate, not a rock is left unturned or piece of ground not probed. When the area has been cleared, they will surge back and forth through it to flush out any of the remnants.

Another critical feature of their operation is the availability of reaction forces. The enemy soon knows when such a cordon is put around him. If he cannot ex-filtrate by individuals or in small numbers, he may attempt to mass his forces and break out at one point. Against such contingencies the ROK's utilize several reaction forces to reinforce critical areas. They have found that the enemy may make one or even several feints at various points around the cordon prior to making the main effort to breach the encirclement. Hence, the ROK deployment of reaction forces is by small incremental elements until such time as the main effort is located, and then the action becomes rapid and positive. Through the use of these tactics, the ROK's have developed the cordon and search operation to a fine state of art. The ratio of enemy to friendly casualties has been phenomenal-on one occasion in excess of 100 to 1.

 

If during the assault on insurgents position (somewhere near BAJOGA) the NA had established something even remotely resembling the above fire base with the three available artillery guns entrenched to provide overlapping 180 degree coverage facing the insurgents position with dig in infantry protecting the guns and each other's flanks. The single tank should have been used to bait the BH into the firing zone of the entrenched artillery guns and dug in infantry. While the four APCs together with the mounted troops should have been used to exploit the weaker flanks of the terrorist and kill all those caught in the open. The tank would have retreated to join up with the entrenched troops and together with the fifth APC should have be pressed for solely targeting the high priority targets like technical’s mounted with anti aircraft guns and IED laden suicide vehicles. Then the outcome of the battle would have been much different.

Let bygones be bygones, but let us spare a thought for those brave soldiers whose lives could have been saved.

And therefore I place heavy emphasis on artillery. Open terrain dotted with hills and heavy bush cover, is ideal for guerrilla strategy and small unit tactics. Artillery and helicopters are much more valuable than tanks and APCs on this type of terrains found in Africa. Artillery can provide continuous indirect fire support anywhere on the battlefield, and helicopters will reinforce their bases with routine flights among them. Thus in the days to come the ability of small units of light SPH and mechanized infantry to operate independently with no or only partial air support will be important for improving kill ratio in most of the battles.

 

“ARTILLERY COMES IN MASS, BUT THE FUTURE, THE NOT-TOO-DISTANT FUTURE, IS ONE SHOT, ONE TARGET,”

This has to be the new line of thinking for the Nigerian army.

THE TARGETS WILL POP UP QUICKLY AND THEN DISAPPEAR. BUT IF U R FAST ENOUGH AND PRECISE ENOUGH, THEN U CAN EFFECTIVELY DESTROY THEM WITH THE FIRST ROUND.

 

 

TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO FIRE ASSAULTS BY ARTILLARY

 

HOW IT IS DONE

Because artillery is an indirect fire weapon, A FORWARD OBSERVER  (FO) is employed. He must take up a position where he can observe the target using binoculars  and laser rangefinders etc and call back fire missions on his radio.

The FO sends map references and bearing to target, a brief target description, a recommended munitions to use, and any special instructions such as "danger close" (the warning that friendly troops are within 600 meters of the target when using artillery, requiring extra precision from the guns).

The FO and the battery basically "walk" the fire onto the target. The FDC (FIRE DIRECTION CONTROL) calculates the CFF (CALL FOR FIRE) and send a deflection and elevation to the gun line. The gun line cranks the specified elevation and deflection on the howitzers and gets ready to fire.

FIG 5: PICTORIAL PRESENTATION OF THE WORKING OF ARTILLERY CALL FOR FIRE PROCESS

Also when the guns have fired the FDC signals the FO and the FO observes the fall of shell. He then signals corrections. These are normally of the form of left/right of the bearing line and distance along it, for example "right 50 add 100" (distance in meters). When the fire is good enough the FO signals "TARGET ON, FIRE FOR EFFECT”. If the mission requires a walking barrage  he may continue sending correction orders.

 

 

MODERN APPROACH TO FIRE ASSAULTS BY ARTILLERY

HOW IT IS DONE

 DIGITAL FIRE SUPPORT OFFICER (FSO)

 Major armies around the world are embracing the concept of Digital Fire Support Officer (Originally co-developed by Elbit and the IDF’s Ground Forces Command) which is modern analogue of the traditional FORWARD OBSERVER (FO) to designate targets for infantry and fire battalions.

Instead of sending in FORWARD OBSERVERS, TACTICAL UAVs are used to create targets and also to direct fire. With network-enabled UAVs to replace traditional FORWARD OBSERVERS to direct fire from artillery guns and rocket systems, artillery will be in a position to share in operations formerly reserved for airpower.

Also instead of completely replacing the FORWARD OBSERVER, the DIGITAL FIRE SUPPORT OFFICER can work in tandem with the FO. It becomes the extended eye in the sky for the FO.

In addition to near precision like standoff attacks against fixed targets, combined arms warfare involving infantry, artillery and other platforms will be able to deal with time-sensitive moving targets at distances ranging from 10 to 40 kilometres.

FOR THE NIGERIAN HOWITZERS BOTH IN UPGRADED TOWED AND SELF PROPELLED VERSION THE MAN PORTABLE ORBITAL TACTICAL UAV AMONG OTHERS IS BEST SUITED TO SERVE AS A DIGITAL FIRE SUPPORT OFFICER ALONE OR IN TANDEM WITH THE TRADITIONAL HUMAN FORWARD OBSERVERS FOR BETTER COMBINED ARMS WARFARE

PART 2 ..........

 

THE KILLER SHARKS AT SEA - ANTI SHIP MISSILES(ASM/AShM)

ANTI SHIP MISSILES(ASM/AShM)

The advent of the anti-ship missile has increased the vulnerability of naval ships.this article aims to provide a brief idea of anti ship missile system and related details.
ASMs can be launched from OTH (over-the-horizon) distances, at sea skimming altitudes just above the top of waves and have sufficient ECCM by which they can counter at least some of the countermeasures applied by the ship. eg HARPOON, EXOCET, URAN etc

US harpoon

In addition to the sea-skimming altitudes, their high transonic speed makes early detection hard which translates into a very short response time for the appropriate countermeasure.
the response time is further reduced by the advent of anti-ship missiles with maneuvering capability at supersonic speeds. eg brahmos,moskit

 

soviet/russian moskit

The threat is even worse if a number of these missiles are launched from different platforms
simultaneously ie coordinated attack to saturate the air defenses of the target ship.(WOLF PACK MODE)

 the above picture shows how wars in the future will be fought.

Some of the ASMs are capable of locking on to the radar emissions of a ship. most modern missiles have anti-jam capabilities and either shut off their seekers and continue on the previous path or lock/home on to the jammer (Home On Jam) if jammed. also many missiles are capable of locking on to the IR signature of a ship making them even more dangerous.newer ASMs are capable of differentiating between the chaff and the ship by using pulse doppler radars in their seekers.
u must understand that radar can act as a homing beacon for some ASMs and thus cannot be relied upon totally as it may have to be shut down in case the missile locks on to the radar emissions.
the other method of detecting the ASM is the ESM on board the ship. using the forward scatter of the missile radar, it should be detected at long ranges. although most sea skimming missiles do not go active until they are fairly close to the target they do have to operate their radar altimeters all the time. a part of this signal is reflected by the waves in the forward direction and could be picked up by a ships ESM systems if they are sensitive enough to detect this forward scatter . this opens up the possibility of jamming the altimeter frequency.
Also a missile not using the altimeter continuously would have to operate at higher altitudes and thus become vurnerable to the anti air missiles.

brahmos missile being fired.

However, if the missile uses passive HOJ or locks on to the IR signature of the ship it would not be detected by conventional ESM. also the use of spread spectrum techniques in the missile radars makes them much harder to detect by ESM. the problem of stealth used by some missiles nowdays can be overcomed by looking for them in the IR region due to that fact that they cannot reduce their IR signature especially if they go to higher operating speeds. thus the IR detection systems will allow us to detect the ASMs.
Also missile like NSM use stealth technology to reduce the RCS and thus reduce the reaction time of the defender. these advance missiles have various ECCM techniques incorporated and thus the ships ECM is rendered useless.

kongsberg NSM

There are 4 stages involved in a missile attack by a ASM

1. the first phase depends on first detecting the target ship. one has to locate and identify where the enemy ships are. this is the surveillance phase. radar is one type of sensor which is used for surveillance. the surveillance radars may in some cases be land based but can also be mounted on satellites, aircrafts uavs etc.

2. the 2nd stage is the deployment of attacking launch platforms and selection of specific targets for missiles or gun fire. this is called the targeting phase. the radars employed in targeting are usually aboard the ships or aircraft that launch the Anti-Ship Missiles.

3. in the third phase, i.e the mid course guidance phase occurs after the missile launch. the midcourse portion of the guidance phase may or may not use radar sensors. some anti- ship missiles use inertial guidance untill they approach the target, then turn on their radar and acquire the target.

4. the fourth phase is the terminal guidance phase, in which the missile radar/IR seeker is actively
tracking the target ship, and attempts to home on the radar echo/heat signature.
thus for a anti ship missile to be successful it is necessary for each of the stages to be successfully negotiated.

In order to effectively engage the missile, detection and tracking of the missile has
to be maintained by means of active and the passive sensors.
1. active detection includes radar and laser.
2. passive detection includes detecting the missiles active radar, electronics, acoustic, thermal IR emissions and other power sources from the target.

Passive detection ranges are much greater than the active detection ranges due to the one way propagation of the electromagnetic wave in the propagation medium. after initial detection and identification is gained, a targeting solution is obtained by employing specific location of the target. once the targeting solution is obtained the anti-missile weapons can be launched. active detection and targeting sensors are in turn subjected to passive detection by the enemy defence providing alert and warning. the best solution is of course to destroy the missile launch platform. however, this is not always possible.

One way of putting the enemy at serious disdvantage is to make them shoot at nothing i.e use decoys, electronic warfare, and even hack the enemy network to create illusory targets. 3 layered defence envelope is necessary to shoot/seduce the incoming missile with

1.anti-missile missiles eg RIM-162 ESSM , Barak 1 & 8 etc

 

 2.close-In Weapon System eg Phalanx , AK-630M , Type 1130, OTO Melara- medium calibre guns etc

 3.decoy systems (chaff, flares or active decoys are employed to seduce attacking anti ship missiles by creating false targets.)

 eg MASS (Multi Ammunition Soft Kill System) shipborne decoy launcher system: MASS is a compact, reactive and fully automatic soft-kill launcher system deploying programmable multi-spectral Omni-Trap decoy rounds with radar, IR, laser, EO and ultraviolet payload, thus providing protection against against anti-ship missiles employing radio frequency (RF) microwave, infrared (IR) and/or electro-optical (EO) seekers.
also Off-board Corner Reflector (OCR) decoys can be utilize to provide an improved capability against anti-ship RF seekers.

 

picture of Corner Reflector (OCR) decoys

Elbit Systems Deseaver MK II decoy control and launching system

however in a fast paced sea battle u can run out of anti missile interceptors, since they are carried only in small numbers.another option is to use laser weapons or electromagnetic rail guns, which are kind of unhindered by the no of reloads.
also modern ASMs capable of turning around and searching for the ship again if it has been decoyed by a chaff,IR decoys etc and has not hit anything. Thus we can see that ASMs are getting more and more intelligent and becoming very dangerous adversary to deal with.