PART 1: CASE STUDY OF WHY AND HOW NIGERIA SHOULD UNDERTAKE COST EFFECTIVE UPGRADATION OF LEGACY 105MM AND 122MM HOWITZERS ALONG WITH THEIR MOBILE VERSION.

WHY?
(PAST AND PRESENT)

They are low-medium intensity conflicts mainly with BH terrorists in the northern part of the country. These “TERRORISTS” are in fact “SOMEWHAT SKILLED SOLDIERS” who have used a blend of traditional terrorist tactics combined with modern war-fighting techniques. They “MANOEUVRE” in reasonably disciplined formations and employ mortars and rockets in deadly barrages.

Use of high mobility APCs; CAPTURED TANKS; TECHNICAL’S mounted with a plethora of medium to heavy machine guns including anti aircraft cannons have become a cause of concern. Use of 14.5MM and 23MM calibre ARMOUR PIERCING and INCENDIARY rounds on infantry is really devastating; to see your colleagues being torn apart to shreds will deter even the BRAVEST OF THE BRAVE.                                                                                                                       

 

FIG1: BH TERRORIST TECHNICAL MOUNTED WITH WHAT LOOKS LIKE A DUAL 14.5 MM ANTI AIRCRAFT GUN

Hordes of “ATV AND MOTORCYCLE MOUNTED TERRORISTS” with RPGs and HEAVY MACHINE GUNs further complicate the situation.

 

FIG2: BH TERRORIST ATV WITH HEAVY MACHINE GUN AND MOTORCYCLE MOUNTED RPG TEAMS

These modern day terrorists have learned to utilize these mobile platforms to OUT-FLANK; OUT-MANOEUVRE engaging forces and PROVIDE REINFORCEMENTS; AMMUNITION RESUPPLY as per changing battlefield conditions.

 

FLASHBACK: TO A REAL LIFE ENCOUNTER OF A NIGERIAN ARMY SERGEANT WITH BH TERRORISTS

A brief yet informative narrative of a sergeant who was let down by circumstances and as far as I am concerned definitely not deserving to be called a deserter considering he served Nigerian Army for about twenty years.

An extract from his narrative

“Movement to the battle field
On a Sunday, precisely on the 8th of February, around 2am, we advanced towards Bajoga, a town between Yobe and Gombe States. We were there before 6am. Before advancing to the battle field, we were fed with tasteless jollof rice that was as dinner. About 9.30 to 10 am we started advancing to the location where the insurgents were. While we were advancing, the three helicopter gun -ships that we were earlier promised would assist in the operation hovered round and landed. Even the Alpha jet came and all of us were jubilant and battle -ready to win at all costs.

Hope dashed
however, five minutes before we met with our target, the helicopter and alpha jet disappeared. Even at the peak of the battle, our commander called them for backup but they did not surface. The battle raged for over four hours, they were surging like locusts towards us with sophisticated weapons including anti-aircraft guns. In conventional wars, such weapons are not used on human beings. They are used to fell aircrafts. But, the insurgents use them brazenly to kill our soldiers. It tears human body into shreds on contact.”

SOURCE: http://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/02/b-o-k-o-h-a-r-a-m-battle-field-account-of-a-military-deserter/

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ABOVE NARRATIVE ARE FAR REACHING.BEFORE THAT PLEASE TAKE A LOOK AT THE PICTURES BELOW TO UNDERSTAND THE SERGEANT POV .I HOPE U HAVE NOW GOT A ROUGH IDEA ABOUT THE SIZE OF THE HOLE IT’S GONNA MAKE WHEN IT HITS A HUMAN. AND JUST THINK HOW DEMORALIZING IT WAS FOR THOSE WHO HAD TO WITNESS IT LIVE.

FIG 3: PICTURE PROVIDES A RELATIVE IDEA OF THE SIZE OF A 12.7 ROUND FIG 4: COMPARISON OF THE 12.7MM ROUND TO 23MM

The underlined lines in the above narrative by the sergeant clearly shows that

1. Cannot rely on air support all the time.

2. worth mentioning is the following extract from the sergeant’s narrative

“OUR EQUIPMENT
it is pertinent to let you know how we were equipped for the war. Before the battle, they gave us three armoured tanks, three artillery guns, five APC’s, grenade launchers and AK47 rifles with three magazines per soldier. But on the day we started advancing, only one armoured tank, five APC’s, and artillery guns advanced with us. If we had gone into battle with, at least, the three armoured tanks, nothing would have made us lose the war. As the battle raged, it did not take time for their fire power to surpass ours.”

Assaults by infantry on heavily armed terrorist without adequate accompanying fire support is suicide. Using towed artillery without proper planning in a fast paced and fluid battlefield eats up manpower and time, and all advantages are turned upside down, which seems was the case here. In short, total mismanagement of available resources.

3. Failure to arm your forces with weapons exceeding or at least similar to the fire power of your opponents will lead to heavy casualties. All this it points to major intelligence failure to identify the weapons being used by the enemy before sending the soldiers to engage those terrorist.

Most of the African countries lack enough aircraft power to provide close bombing air support so the only option is to use artillery for providing massive fire support. And I don’t think this situation is going to change anytime soon. And Nigeria is no exception.

The Republic of Korea was the first in Vietnam to demonstrate micromanaged heavy artillery support from company-level fire bases for major operations. Unlike the US military which often constructed one big fire base for a battalion sized unit, to serve more strategic roles, Korean forces fragmented a battalion into several companies that had their own small fire bases to help win individual battles. They were built as close to each other as possible, the distance between them determined by the range of their artillery (most had mortars, some had 105mm howitzers). Their preference for smaller bases was also driven by the fact that Korean forces did not possess many 155mm for more large-scale and long-range bombardment. The companies' overlapping artillery coverage protected each other's flanks, and kept a continuous fire envelop over the paths that companies used to scout, encircle and establish cordon on the battalion's intended area of operations. Each company worked as reactionary forces for others from various points on the battlefield, both remotely and up close and personal.

On a smaller scale, they also had overlapping field of fire within the company base among platoons. When one platoon was pinned down under heavy fire from NV, it made it easier for the rest in the company to support that platoon by hitting the enemy from the rear. The result of this tactic in Koreans' small unit operations was phenomenal, as Korean ground forces in Vietnam continued to rack up massive kill ratio against NVA and the Viet Cong throughout the war. In some operations like Van Buren, Korean platoons annihilated an entire NVA battalion and disabled the regiment with very minimal losses. The high tactical viability and effectiveness of the company fire base concept set a precedent for other Free World forces to adapt it as one of their doctrine, even after the war had ended.

An analysis of Korean cordon and search operations was provided by Lieutenant General William R. Peers, who considered the Koreans to have more expertise in this kind of operation than any of the other forces he had seen in South Vietnam:

There were several key elements in their conduct of this type of operation. First, they are thorough in every detail in their

planning. Secondly, their cordon involves a comparatively small area, probably not in excess of 9 to 10 square kilometers for a regimental size force. Third, the maximum force is employed, generally consisting of a regiment up to something in excess of a division. And finally, the operation is rehearsed and critiqued before it is begun. Units are moved into locations around the periphery of the cordon by a variety of means, including helicopters, trucks and by foot, but so limed that all arrive in position simultaneously to complete the encirclement. The density of the troops is such that the distance between individuals on the cordon is less than 10 meters. They leave little opportunity for the enemy to ex-filtrate in small numbers. Areas, such as streams and gulley’s, are barricaded with barbed wire and other barrier materials, reinforced by troops who may remain in water chest deep over night. The closing of the cordon is very slow and deliberate, not a rock is left unturned or piece of ground not probed. When the area has been cleared, they will surge back and forth through it to flush out any of the remnants.

Another critical feature of their operation is the availability of reaction forces. The enemy soon knows when such a cordon is put around him. If he cannot ex-filtrate by individuals or in small numbers, he may attempt to mass his forces and break out at one point. Against such contingencies the ROK's utilize several reaction forces to reinforce critical areas. They have found that the enemy may make one or even several feints at various points around the cordon prior to making the main effort to breach the encirclement. Hence, the ROK deployment of reaction forces is by small incremental elements until such time as the main effort is located, and then the action becomes rapid and positive. Through the use of these tactics, the ROK's have developed the cordon and search operation to a fine state of art. The ratio of enemy to friendly casualties has been phenomenal-on one occasion in excess of 100 to 1.

 

If during the assault on insurgents position (somewhere near BAJOGA) the NA had established something even remotely resembling the above fire base with the three available artillery guns entrenched to provide overlapping 180 degree coverage facing the insurgents position with dig in infantry protecting the guns and each other's flanks. The single tank should have been used to bait the BH into the firing zone of the entrenched artillery guns and dug in infantry. While the four APCs together with the mounted troops should have been used to exploit the weaker flanks of the terrorist and kill all those caught in the open. The tank would have retreated to join up with the entrenched troops and together with the fifth APC should have be pressed for solely targeting the high priority targets like technical’s mounted with anti aircraft guns and IED laden suicide vehicles. Then the outcome of the battle would have been much different.

Let bygones be bygones, but let us spare a thought for those brave soldiers whose lives could have been saved.

And therefore I place heavy emphasis on artillery. Open terrain dotted with hills and heavy bush cover, is ideal for guerrilla strategy and small unit tactics. Artillery and helicopters are much more valuable than tanks and APCs on this type of terrains found in Africa. Artillery can provide continuous indirect fire support anywhere on the battlefield, and helicopters will reinforce their bases with routine flights among them. Thus in the days to come the ability of small units of light SPH and mechanized infantry to operate independently with no or only partial air support will be important for improving kill ratio in most of the battles.

 

“ARTILLERY COMES IN MASS, BUT THE FUTURE, THE NOT-TOO-DISTANT FUTURE, IS ONE SHOT, ONE TARGET,”

This has to be the new line of thinking for the Nigerian army.

THE TARGETS WILL POP UP QUICKLY AND THEN DISAPPEAR. BUT IF U R FAST ENOUGH AND PRECISE ENOUGH, THEN U CAN EFFECTIVELY DESTROY THEM WITH THE FIRST ROUND.

 

 

TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO FIRE ASSAULTS BY ARTILLARY

 

HOW IT IS DONE

Because artillery is an indirect fire weapon, A FORWARD OBSERVER  (FO) is employed. He must take up a position where he can observe the target using binoculars  and laser rangefinders etc and call back fire missions on his radio.

The FO sends map references and bearing to target, a brief target description, a recommended munitions to use, and any special instructions such as "danger close" (the warning that friendly troops are within 600 meters of the target when using artillery, requiring extra precision from the guns).

The FO and the battery basically "walk" the fire onto the target. The FDC (FIRE DIRECTION CONTROL) calculates the CFF (CALL FOR FIRE) and send a deflection and elevation to the gun line. The gun line cranks the specified elevation and deflection on the howitzers and gets ready to fire.

FIG 5: PICTORIAL PRESENTATION OF THE WORKING OF ARTILLERY CALL FOR FIRE PROCESS

Also when the guns have fired the FDC signals the FO and the FO observes the fall of shell. He then signals corrections. These are normally of the form of left/right of the bearing line and distance along it, for example "right 50 add 100" (distance in meters). When the fire is good enough the FO signals "TARGET ON, FIRE FOR EFFECT”. If the mission requires a walking barrage  he may continue sending correction orders.

 

 

MODERN APPROACH TO FIRE ASSAULTS BY ARTILLERY

HOW IT IS DONE

 DIGITAL FIRE SUPPORT OFFICER (FSO)

 Major armies around the world are embracing the concept of Digital Fire Support Officer (Originally co-developed by Elbit and the IDF’s Ground Forces Command) which is modern analogue of the traditional FORWARD OBSERVER (FO) to designate targets for infantry and fire battalions.

Instead of sending in FORWARD OBSERVERS, TACTICAL UAVs are used to create targets and also to direct fire. With network-enabled UAVs to replace traditional FORWARD OBSERVERS to direct fire from artillery guns and rocket systems, artillery will be in a position to share in operations formerly reserved for airpower.

Also instead of completely replacing the FORWARD OBSERVER, the DIGITAL FIRE SUPPORT OFFICER can work in tandem with the FO. It becomes the extended eye in the sky for the FO.

In addition to near precision like standoff attacks against fixed targets, combined arms warfare involving infantry, artillery and other platforms will be able to deal with time-sensitive moving targets at distances ranging from 10 to 40 kilometres.

FOR THE NIGERIAN HOWITZERS BOTH IN UPGRADED TOWED AND SELF PROPELLED VERSION THE MAN PORTABLE ORBITAL TACTICAL UAV AMONG OTHERS IS BEST SUITED TO SERVE AS A DIGITAL FIRE SUPPORT OFFICER ALONE OR IN TANDEM WITH THE TRADITIONAL HUMAN FORWARD OBSERVERS FOR BETTER COMBINED ARMS WARFARE

PART 2 ..........